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In tbe 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
PARLEY D. BILLS, ., 
Plaintiff and Appetlnnt, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9028 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff commenced this suit to recover for alleged 
injuries suHtained when he fell in a caboose of defendant's 
freight train. He alleged that the fall was caused by negli-
gence of the defendant in subjecting the caboose "to an 
unusually violent jerk * * * which, by its nature, was 
not reasonably to be expected by plaintiff" (R. 2). Defen-
dant also alleged res ipsa loquitur. The pretrial order 
limited the contentions of negligence to those alleged and 
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the case was tried and submitted on the said theory Gf 
negligence set forth in the complaint (See Pretrial Order 
R. 5; Plaintiff's Requested Instructions R. 8; and II!Btrue-
tions of the Court R. 28-56). The jury returned a verdict 
of "no cause of action." Judgment was entered on the 
verdict and a motion for new trial denied. This appeal fol-
lowed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's statement of the facts is substantially cor-
rect as far as it goes. There are additional facts, however, 
which should be before the Court in considering the law 
questions raised on this appeaL The defendant earnestly 
contended at the time of trial and now contends that there 
was no evidence of negligence on the part of the Railroad 
and that the trial court should have directed a verdict. The 
defendant's position will be dear when the Court is fur-
nished a little background regarding the nature of the 
equipment and operations which were involved in the case. 
The plaintiff at the time of the accident was riding in 
the caboose of an 89 car train. He was the conductor or 
foreman in charge of the train (R. 143). The train was 
engaged in switching operations in the Provo yard. The 
defendant's employees were making up a train which was 
to move south on defendant's line to Thistle. In the course 
of stopping the train on a switching move, the caboose re-
ceived a jerk eaused by "slack" action. Plaintiff contends 
that this was "an unusually violent jerk * * * which 
by its nature was not reasonably to be expected by plain-
tiff" (R. 2). Plaintiff's own evidence shows that jerks 
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caused by slack action in switching moves are unavoidable; 
that this was not an "unusual" jerk, and that such jerks 
are to be expected in moves of this kind. In explanation of 
what happened in this case, the evidence of both parties 
demonstrates the following: 
(1) The couplers of freight cars (unlike passen-
ger cars) are relatively loose. There are 6 to 12 inches 
of play in each coupling so that on a train of 90 cars 
there would be 45 to· 90 feet of play. Thus in starting 
from a standstill position an engine on such a train 
might move 2 car lengths (R. 219) before the caboose 
on the end of the train even starts to move. On a train 
of 90 cars, the caboose would be approximately 1 mile 
behind the locomotive. 
(2) In stopping a freight train the slack tends 
i· to be taken up by "bunching" of the cars toward the 
head end of the train. On short, slow moves on level 
ground, such as are involved in switching moves, there 
' 
' ii 
is always "slack" action when a train is brought to a 
stop because the engine and first cars in the train stop 
before the train is "bunched" and the cars to the rear 
"run into" the stopped cars causing an abrupt stop on 
the rear end of the train. 
(3) Trainmen are always expecting this slack 
action during switching moves and they are schooled 
to take preventative action to avoid injury to them-
selves. It is not a question as to whether or not there 
will be slack action. There always is in a move such 
as was involved in this case. Trainmen know that the 
slack action may be comparatively mild or very severe 
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and that the slower and shorter the move and the 
longer the train the more severe the slack action will 
be. 
(4) Slack action may be diminished by applica-
tion of the train brakes (which brake the cars attacl!€d 
to the train) as oppoi!ed to the independent brakes 
(which brake the engine only), but on an 89 car train 
tho brakes on the rear cars of the train are not actu-
ated until 30 seconds after air is applied in the engine 
and on a short move it is impossible to prevent slaclt 
action because the brakes toward the rear end of t!Je 
train do not take effect before the stop. 
In the light of this background of fact, the Court should 
consider the following testimony from plaintiff himself and 
the witnesses called on his behalf. 
The plaintiff testified: 
(R. 151) 
"Q. * * * In freight trains, and particu-
larly long freight trains, there is a great opportunity 
for the cars to run in and bunch up and cause slack 
action, is there not1 
"A. Yes, sir." 
(R. 153) 
"Q. * * * lsn't it a fact that you usually 
try and stay off the cabooses until the train does 
leave town, to avoid slack action? 
"A. Generally, that is true. 
"Q. Well, then, generally if you stay off of the 
cabooses to aYoid slack action, you generally antici· 
pate and expect slack action, don't you, .Mr. Bills? 
"A. \Ve expect slack action at times, and are 
always tense and ready for slack action, to a nor!!lil 
degree. 
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"Q. Well, as a matter of fact, in railroading 
with moving freight car~, you anticipate and expect 
slack action all the time, do you not, Mr. Bills? 
"A. Yes. 
, , , , 
"Q. * * * Don't you have a sign on the 
caboose that says what you should do in order to 
protect yourself against slack action? 
"A. We have a sigu in the caboose that said 
that to be prepared for slack actinn, especially at 
Wrminals and entering stations. 
"Q. The sign says 'Be prepared for slack ac-
tion, especially in going in and out of sidings.' 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. And in other words, on a caboose, you are 
supposed to be prepared for slack action all the time, 
are you not, Mr. Bills? 
"A. That's right." 
(R. 163) 
"Q. Actually, of course what the men had to 
do was to pick up, to stop the train 20 carlengths 
back and put in some other cars for Thistle. 
"A. Yes, that's right. 
"Q. And that is normal and usual that actions 
like that occur when you are engaged in making up a 
train, is it not? 
"A. y . es, str. 
"Q. And trains will frequently stop m yard 
limits, will they not? 
"A. y . es, s1r. 
"Q. To do the very sort of thing that happened 
here, isn't that right? 
"A. Yes." 
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The plaintiff then testified that he mistakenly tho-ught tbe 
train was made up and leaving town but when asked if he 
was unprepared for slack action for this reason he said: 
"Like I say, we are alwayH expecting slack action" (R. 164). 
He then acknowledged his acquaintance with the railroad 
safety rule which provides that "employees must protect 
themselves againat injury, as far as possible, from jerks, 
slack action "' * * or any other unexpected motion by 
keeping a firm grip and secure foothold when riding on or 
in moving equipment" (R. 165). The examination of plain-
tiff continued as follows: 
(R. 170) 
"Q. * * • You wouldn't want to have this 
jury believe that there are not occasions when there 
is violent slack action back in a caboose. 
"A. There is lots of occruJions. 
"Q. Yes, lots of occa.sions. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And it's the sort of thing you have to pro· 
teet yourself against, and expect, is it not, Mr. Bills1 
"A. Yes, sir." 
• • 
' 
• • 
(R. 171) 
"Q. "' "' "' You told Mr. West that tni.! 
rviolent] slack action wasn't unusual. 
"A. That's :right. 
"Q. 
"A. 
often. 
And it wasn't unusual 
Not to the extent that it does happen quite 
"Q. So that this kind of slack action which you 
got on this occasion happens frequently? 
"A. I wouldn't say frequently, but-
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"Q. Well, quite often, then? 
"A. Quite often, yes. 
"Q. All right. And so that you can expect that 
kind of slack action. 
"A. Yes." 
Plaintiff, referring to the slack action involved in this 
case said it was "severe" but "not unusual" (R. 154). His 
written and signed statement given only a few days after 
the accident was as follows: 
"* * * This slack run-in was severe, but 
not unusual. We have slack run-in like this practic-
ally every time a stop is made with a long train. The 
longer the train, the more severe slack action we 
get. If I had known this stop was to be made I 
would have been prepared for it. If I had remained 
at my desk l probably would have had the wind 
knocked out, but would not have injured my back. 
"I would not say there was any mishandling of 
the engine or train at all. This same move is made 
at Provo on almost all locals that go east, and I have 
handled work in this same way hundreds of times. 
We do the work differently, depending on what the 
men decide when they go to cut the thrn cars in be-
hind the shorts. Sometimes they cut them in before 
we pull up, so when the start is made we just con-
tinue out of town, and other times they handle it in 
the manner done on this date. Either way is proper 
and usual. 
"I preommed that the thru cars had been cut in 
before they started moving with the ca:boose. 
"There was nothing wrong with the caboose, 
and nothing wrong with the handling of the train 
and engine. Reason for this accident was the slack 
action, and the fact that I presumed they were leav-
ing town. 
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"* * * I don't think there is any way to 
prevent slack a.ction in a move of this sort. Our 
speed was only about five miles per hour before the 
slack ran in, which is ordinary for this move. 
"This slack run-in was severe, but really not 
unusual. • '" 
(Exhibit 12, SeeR. 155-163.) 
Regarding whether the train brakes or the independent 
brakes were used to effect the stop, plaintiff's testimony 
was uncertain. He acknowledged that on a short move 
necessitating a quick stop the use of either the train brake 
(service application) or the independent brakes would re-
sult in violent slack action (R. 179). He was then asked: 
(R. 180) 
"Q. And you don't, therefore, know whether he 
made an independent application or a service appli· 
cation. 
"A. I can't say definitely." 
Plaintiff called the Brakeman, J. E. Wonnacott. Won-
nacott related the type of move that was being made (R. 
208-224). The train was to be moved 20 car lengths and 
then stopped. The engineer had to rely on signals from the 
brakeman and the move and stop had to be made within 
a given distance in order to accomplish the purpose of it. 
Then regarding the impossibility of preventing slack action 
in such a move, Wonnacott testified as follows: 
(R. 223-224) 
"Q. He [the engineer] wouldn't be free Ill 
travel as far as he wanted to before he stopped, 
would he? 
":'. N b h ·'· 
-"'- " o; ecause e was supposed to oper..,., 
on signal. 
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"Q. And if he got a signal here from Serassio 
to stop, his job was to- bring the cars to a stop as 
quickly as he can. 
it? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And that's what he did. 
"A. y . es, s1r. 
"Q. That's what he was supposed to d{l, wasn't 
"A. y 
"· 
"Q. Wei~ now, when _you bring a cut of cal's, 
a long string of cars, to a quick stop, and the slack 
is strcached out, you get slack action, don't you'! 
"A. y 
"· 
"Q. Do you know any way to avoid that? 
"A. No. 
"Q. There isn't any way to avoid it, is there1 
"A. !\'otto my knowledge. 
"Q. And when you get cars strung out, partic-
ulady at a slow speed, and they move up, and the 
cars ;;top on the signal of a brakeman, why, that 
means that that Klack has got to run in as that train 
is brought to a stop, does it not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And that means slack action. 
".A. y 
"· 
"Q. And very often, severe slack action. 
"A. Yes." 
Wonnacott testified that a service application would take 
thirty seconds to get air to the rear end of the train (R. 
230). He did say that in his opinion an independent appli-
cation had been made, but he was in no '\.\ise qualified to 
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express such an opinion and the trial court properly sus-
tained defendant's objection to counsel's question calling 
for \\'onnacott's opinion as to whether or not the train on 
this occasion could have been stopped with less violent slack 
action (R. 231). 
The rear brakeman, Frank Serassio, also testified for 
the plaintiff. He had control of the move. The objective 
of the move was to place the train some 20 car lengths ahead 
and stop at a given point (R. 242). Serassio gave the stop 
signal and the engineer stopped the train "right where I 
wanted him to stop" (R. 246). In other words, the engi. 
neer executed the very stop which Serassio wanted and 
"expected" (R. 246). Regarding the slack action which 
accompanied the move, Serassio testified as follows: 
(R. 247) 
"Q. Now, Mr. Serassio, you, of course, have 
been familiar with the movement of trains, and the 
effect of slack action, over the years, have you not? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And slaek action is a common thing! 
"A. It is. 
"Q. You expect to see it often, don't you7 
"A. \Yell, you do. ,\-es. 
"Q. And you do see it frequently, quite hon-
estly, don't you, Mr. Serassio? 
"A. You do. 
"Q. Every time the cars are bunched in, and 
you string them out and stop them. they have to run 
back in, don't they? 
"A, That's right. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
"Q. And when they run back in that causes a 
slack action, doesn't it. 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And the longer the train, the greater the 
slack action. 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And the slower the speed, the greater the 
slack action. 
"A. That's right. 
• • • • • 
"Q. And you gave him the stop sign. 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And he stopped. 
"A. That's absolutely right. 
"Q. But my point, Mr. Serassio, is, that that 
is the very situation where you get violent slack 
action. 
"A. That's right." 
(R. 252) 
"Q. Well, slack action is something you very 
commonly run into in railroading, isn't it? 
"A. Well, you have it all the time. 
"Q. Surely. And, as a matter of fact, the worst 
place for it is back on the caboose. 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. A11d as a result, you have signs up on the 
caboose warning you about slack action, don't you? 
"A. Well, it-There is signs in the caboose 
telling you to be braced for it, yes." 
Serassio testified that severe run~ins are not uncommon 
(R. 254). Regarding the use of the independent as opposed 
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to the service or train brake, Semssio thought that there had 
been an application of the former. He was 1 mile behind 
the engine, ho\vever, and in no position to judge. 
As opposed to the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant 
called the locomotive engineer of the train, Emil 0. Kroo-
scher. Kroescher is a locomotive engineer of over twenty 
years' experience. He testified a~ to the different methods 
of braking, stating that when operating a string of cars 
on a long train the locomotive engineer uses the train brake 
or service application. In this case he made a service appli-
cation (R. 296). Serassio had testified that he gave the 
signal to stop approximately 3 or 4 car lengths before the 
train stopped (R. 244). Confirming this, the engineer stAted 
that the train would stop within 3 car lengths with a service 
application and that had the independent brake been used 
it would have taken 6 to 7 car lengths. He also testified 
that there was al\\ ayH slack action in moving a train having 
as many cars as was on this train (R. 305). His action 
was in every way in accordance with the direction of the 
brakeman and the custom and practice of the industry. The 
resulting slack action ,,·as the normal and usual consequence 
of a stop of this type. 
Defendant also called its road foreman of equipment, 
Mr. Benjamin Harrison ""agner, whose duty it is to super-
vise, promote, examine and educate engineers and firemen. 
He himself was an engineer and fireman of 41 years' ex-
perknce and for the past 16 to 18 years has made special 
sturlies and re~ts regarding brakes on diesel engines {It 
311-312). He explained to the jury how the different types 
of brakes on a locomotive engine work. \Vaguer confirmed 
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the plaintiff's evidence that on a service application there 
would be no brake application to the rear of the car for 30 
seconds after the brakes had boon applied in the locomotive 
(R. 316). His te.stimony was thai there are 5 to 6 inches of 
slack in couplers on a freight car and that with 2 cars 
coupled together, there would be 10 to 12 inches of slack, 
indicating that on a train of 90 cars there would be approxi-
mately 90 feet of slack or play in the entire string (R. 317). 
His testimony substantiated that of the engineer that had 
the independent brake been applied the train could not have 
possibly been stopped in less than 6 car lengths (R. 319-
20). The service application in the normal and usual man-
ner would have stopped the train within 21/~ to 3 car lengths 
(R. 320). Considering the length of the train and the dis· 
tance of the move, his expert testimony indicated that there 
was no way this particular move could have been made 
without severe slack action (R. 322·326). 
At the trial the plaintiff p.Jaced the sole blame for the 
accident on the engineer who he claimed made an improper 
brake application (R. 197). There was no claim made that 
the move itself 'vas uncessary and unrea.~onable and there-
fore negligent. Plaintiff's statement regarding the move 
was set forth in Exhibit 12 where it is said; 
"This same move is made at Provo on almost 
all locals that go east, and J have handled work in 
this same way hundreds of times. We do the work 
differently, depending upon what the men decide 
when they go to cut the thru cars in behind the 
shorts. Sometimes they cut them before we pull up, 
so when the start is made we just continue out of 
town, and other timer; they handle it in the manner 
done on this date. Either way is proper and u.sual." 
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In abstracting the plaintiff's evidence, we have taken 
that portion which is least favorable to plaintiff's conten-
tion of negligence in view of the rule adopted by this Court 
that unless such least favorable evidence is of such a char-
acter as will sustain a verdict on that issue, the plaintiff ill 
not entitled to go to a jury. Wheeler v. Fidelity and Deposit 
Company of Ma.ryland, (8th Cir.), 63 F. 2d 562; Benson v. 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah 
2d 38, 286 P. 2d 790. Considering the plaintiff's evideilte 
in light of defendant's case, there was no substantial evi-
dence of negligence upon the part of the Railroad Company. 
The finding was inescapable that the switching move in-
volved here was impossible of execution without resultill,IJ' 
slack action. 
All of the errors Msigned by the appellant relate W 
instructions given by the court. We submit that plaintiff 
was not entitled to go to a jury and it follows that no in-
struction, erroneous or otherwise, could have any bearing 
on the proper outcome of the case. Assuming arguendo that 
there was a fact question on the issue of defendant's negli-
gence, still there was no error which would justify a re-
versal of the judgment below. The following pages will 
discuss the instructions complained of by the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
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POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 \VAS NOT PREJUDI~ 
CIAL ERROR. 
POINT III. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
POINT IV. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
POINT V. 
INSTRUCTION :-JO. 24 WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
POINT VI. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR WHEN IT STRUCK THE TES-
TIMOKY OF THE WITNESS, PAUL FRANK 
THOMAS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
INSTRUCTION :-:TO. 25 WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
Instrudon No. 25 told the jury what was required of 
the plaintiff "by the safety rules of The Denver and Rio 
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Grande Western Railroad Company," i. e., "to protect him-
self against injury (/.,fj far as possible from jerks, slack ac-
tion or any other unexpected motion by keeping a firm 
grip and a secure foothold when riding on or in moving 
equipment." The enactment of safety rules for the protee. 
tion of employees is recognized b~· the courts as a salutory 
practice not to be discouraged by judicial disregard of the 
employee's violation. In fact, the general rule appears to 
be that in a suit again~t his employer, an employee's dis-
obedience of a safety rule promulgated for the employee's 
protection amounts to negligence as a matter of law. 
35 Am. Jur. 701. Cases collected at footnote 13. 
Urwdiil~ Valley R. Co. v. Caldirw, 278 U. S.139, 
49 Sup. Ct. 91. 
The existence of a safety rule and the employee's knowl-
edge of it are always material in determining whether or 
not the employee was negligent. Plaintiff's complaint here 
is that the safety rule was made the standard of care and 
that it is a more stringent standard than the law otherwise 
1mposes. We submit that neither position is correct. 
The standard of care imposed by the rules of negli-
gence was defined in Instructions K os. 7, 11, 12 and 13. 
Plaintiff takes no exception to these instructions. The im-
port of Instruction 1\" o. 25 is not to ><ULstitute the safety 
rule for the standard set forth in these 4 instructions but 
merel:l'· to advise the jury of the rale. This was perfectly 
proper for even if it be held that a knowing violation is not 
negligence per se, ~till it is a circumstance to be considered 
by the jury in cleliberating on the issue of negligence. The 
instruction tells the jury what the safetr rules require of 
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the plaintiff. It does not tell the jury that a violation IS 
negligence. 
Assume, however, that the instruction is to be inter-
preted as informing the jury that a violation of this par-
ticular safety rule would be negligence per se. Was it error 
under the facts of this case to so instruct the jury? We 
think not. Plaintiff's objection is that the rule requires 
the plaintiff to anticipate negligence. This is not so. The 
rule does require plaintiff to anticipate "as. far as possible, 
jerks, slack action or any other unexpected motion * * * 
when riding on or in moving equipment". Here we are 
talking about "slack action" and not "any other unexpected 
motion." It is possible for plaintiff to anticipate slack 
action on freight trains in yard limits and under the evi-
dence reasonable care requires that much as a matter of 
law. Plaintiff's ovin evidence demonstrates that trainmen 
must always be prepared for slack action in yard limits in 
order to protect themselvef!. It is not possible to anticipate 
negligence and since the rule requiref! only that the employee 
protect himself "as far as possible" it does not mean that 
he must anticipate negligence. That porf'lon of the rule 
rrw.terial to the facts of this case reqwires only that the wm-
ployee protect himself "as far liB pos.qible from * * * 
slack action." This is not unrem;onable. Certainly the rea-
sonable man standard would require this of a trainman in 
plaintiff's poRition. This safety rule is like the one involved 
in the case of Pwu.ly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 398, 166 P. 2d 
501, where the court said: 
"It was a cautionary rule for the safety of the 
employee. It simply put in rulo fonn a pr<>euution 
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which common sense would without the rule lmve 
prescribed as proper care on the part of a prudent 
man." 
Plaintiff also contends that the instruction revives the 
defense of assumed risk. Apparently it is plaintiff's posi-
tion that the instruction tells the jury in effect that the 
plaintiff cannot recover if he knew or was aware of danger 
presented by the defendant's negligence. The complete 
answer to this tenuous argument is that neither this in-
struction nor any other instruction given by the court in-
structs the jury that violation of the safety rule or even 
negligence of the plaintiff would be a defense. The jury 
was instructed that if the defendant was guilty of negli-
gence which proximately caused plaintiff's injuries, plain-
tiff was entitled to recover (without regard to plaintiff's 
negligence). In the cases cited by plaintiff, there was an 
instruction on assumed risk and the same was accompanied 
with a statement that the plaintiff could not recover if be 
knew or was aware of the danger. This instruction at the 
most defined the standard of care and nothing more. It 
did not even relate to assumed risk and there was no Jan· 
guage therein which indicated that plaintiff's own conduct 
could be a defense. We submit that Instruction No, 25 Wllll 
not error. 
But even should the court conclude that Instruction No. 
25 was error, it could not possibly have been prejudicial 
error. We have already pointed out that there was no sub-
stantial evidence of negligence and hence the matter shCinld 
not have been submitted to the jury. Aside from this, how· 
ever, the jury's verdict of "no cause of action" necessarily 
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(under the instructions of the court) amounts to a finding 
that the defendant was not guilty of negligence which was 
a proximate cause of the accident. It must be remembered 
that contributory negligence is not a defense in F. E. L. A. 
ca5es. lt is material only by way of diminution of damages 
(45 U.S. C. A.§ 53. See Appellant's Brief and cases cited, 
Page 21). The court repeatedly instructed the jury that if 
they found the defendant negligent. • • 
"And if you further find from a preponderance 
of the evidence tJhat such negligence proximately 
caused, in whole or in part, injuries to plaintiff then 
you should return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant and award to plaintiff 
damages as in these instructions set forth." (In-
structions Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15.) 
The jury under the instructions was to return a verdict 
regardless of plaintiff's negligence if they found defendant 
was negligent and its negligence was a proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries. 
"Plaintiff's negligence had a bearing only to the extent 
it might diminish the amount of the verdict (R. 344). A 
"no cause of action" verdict in this case necessarily meant 
that the jury found there was no negligence on the part of 
the railroad company proximately contributing to the in-
juries of plaintiff. Had the jury found the issues of negli-
gence and proximate cause in favor of plaintiff, it would 
have been their duty under the instructions of the court 
to return a verdict in favor of plaintiff (See the fonns of 
verdict and the court's expla.nation to the Jury. R. 344). 
We find no instruction here which would allow the jury 
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to return a verdict of no cause of action on account of plain-
tiff's negligence even if it were the sole proximate eause 
of the accident. If there had been such an instruction given, 
it would not change the picture here for a finding that 
plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause would necessaxily 
mean that the jury found there was no negligence on the 
part of the defendant which proximately caused the acci-
dent. 
Since the jury's verdict amountil to a finding of no 
negligence on the part of defendant proximaWly causing 
the plaintiff's injuries, no instruction on contributory neg-
ligence could have been prejudicial. 
POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 WAS NOT PREJLDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
Plaintiff's counsel complain of instruction .t\o. 19 be-
cause it precluded recovery unless the jury found that there 
was "an unexpected jarring or jerking of unusual and un· 
necessary severity." It is claimed that this was prejudicial 
error because it placed the burden upon plaintiff 
"of establishing not only that the stop wa:> unus-
ually and unnecessarily :>evere, but that no stop was 
reasonably to be expected by plaintiff. An expected 
stop could be of the severest nature imaginable, and 
could be caused by the gravest kind of neglect, but 
plaintiff still couldn't recover under thi~ instruc-
tion." (Appellant's Brief, Page 21.) 
The evidence in thiR case is undisputed that the jar which 
caused plaintiff"s fall wa.<> "unexpected" by him. The record 
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is replete with his explanation that he thought the train 
was pulling out and he did not exped a stop. Contrary to 
plaintiff's interpretation, the instruction refers only to 
a stop "not expected" by plaintiff and says nothing about 
a stop "not reasonably to be expected." Under this instruc-
tion the plaintiff did not have the burden to sho'v that the 
stop was in the latter category. Perhaps the court should 
have required this proof but plaintiff cannot complain of 
the court's failure to impose that burden. 
There was no evidence here as to "an expected stop" 
and counsel's statement that "an expected stop could be of 
the severest nature imaginable * * * but plaintiff 
still couldn't recover" is just grasping at straws. This case 
involves a stop which all parties agree was "unexpected" 
by plaintiff. The word "unexpected" as it is used in this 
instruction is actually surplusage. 
Plaintiff's final attack on this instruction is that it 
"eliminates plaintiff's right to recover if the stop, 
although normal, wa..'l not reasonably to be expected." 
(Appellant's Brief, Pages 21-22.) 
The answer to this argument is that if this stop was not 
unusually or unnece~~arily ~evere (or as plaintiff say, it 
was a "normal" stop) defendant could not be held guilty 
of negligence. If not "unusually or unnecessarily severe" 
it follows that any jar 'vhich accompanied the stop was 
usual and necessary. Plaintiff cannot recover simply be-
cause a stop wa.s made when he didn't expect it. We find 
no decisions which hold a railroad company guilty of negli-
gence by reason of the fact that a freight train was stopped 
during switching operations in a railroad yard. 
Instruction 19 was not error. 
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POINT III. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
Plaintiff's counsel take exception to Instruction No. 
20 because it * * * 
"eliminates plaintiff's contention that the making of 
the stop at all could have been found by the jury to 
be negligence on the part of the railroad company." 
(Appellant's Brief, Pages 22-23.) 
Plaintiff made no contention below that the making of the 
stop itself amounted to negligence. There was no suclt 
allegation in the pleadings. There was no such contention 
made at pre-trial when the contentions of negligence were 
limited to those pleaded There was no requested instruction 
on this theory. Plaintiff's testimony itself limits the issue 
as follows; 
(R. 197) 
"Q. In any event, you don't blame any of the 
brakemen for anything that occurred in this partic-
ular case? 
"A. " . • ~o. s1r. 
"Q. You are putting the blame solely on llll 
improper application of the brakes by the engineer. 
"A. Yes, sir." 
See also R. 156, 157. 
Switching operations are necessarily characterized by 
stops and starts and short movements. There was nothin& 
unusual about this movement. Plaintiff's own eviden~ 
demonstrates this. It is possible that the switching of C31'S 
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into the train could have been handled in one of two altern-
ative ways. With regard to this, plaintiff said: "Either 
way is proper and usual" (Exhibit 12). The experienced 
trainmen decided on the move which was made and the 
engineer simply acted on the brakemen's signals. Certainly 
the move itself was not negligence. Defendant was not 
deprived of any of his contentions below. 
Plaintiff also urges that Instruction No. 20 does vio-
lence to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because of the 
statement therein that 
"slack action, even though * * * severe * * * 
doe~ not in and of itself establish negligence on the 
part of the Railroad." 
This, of course, was a correct statement of the law. It did 
not deprive plaintiff of the benefit of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur. Counsel's statement that "unexplained severe 
slack aetion would support a finding of negligence" (Ap-
pellant's Brief, Page 25) is not the law. If res ipsa was 
applicable in this case, it was only on a finding (1) that 
the train was in the po&."!ession of and und~r the exclusive 
control of the defendant and that it appears that the injury 
resulted from some act or omission incident to the defen-
dant's responsibility to use due care with respect to such 
train; (2) that the incident was of such nature as does not 
happen in the ordinary course of things if those who have 
control of the train use ordinary care, and (3) that the 
circumstances surrounding the causing of the occurrence 
were such that the plaintiff is not in a position to know 
what specific conduct was the cause, where the defendant 
may reasonably be expected to kno,v, and be able to explain 
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the cause of the incident. J. l. F. U. 17.30; White v. Pinney, 
99 utah 484, 108 P. 2d 249; Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supp!11 
Co., 99 Utah 496, 108 P. 2d 254; Wightma-n V. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co., 5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P. 2d 171. Thus, slack 
action alone (explained or unexplained) was not enough 
to support an inference or finding of negligence, and In-
struction No. 20 was correct. Plaintiff got the fuli benefit 
of the doctrine of res ipsa from lnstruction Xo. 14. 
But, plaintiff was not entitled to go to the jury on res 
ipsa anyway. His own evidence failed W satisfy the re. 
quirements of the doctrine. Slack action wa.s shown to be 
a necessary and common incident of switching movements. 
Severe slack action commonly occurs in the absence of negli-
gence and plaintiff and every one ll"f his witnesses (except 
the doctor) knew and testified as to the cause of slru:k 
action. This was not such an incident as "does not happen 
in the ordinary course of things" nor was plaintiff in a 
position where he could not be expected to "know what 
specific conduct was the cause." Plaintiff him.self said that 
it was common and usual for slack action to accompany 
switching movement.s and that it was common for freight 
trains to stop and start within ~~ard limits. According to 
his own testimony, the slack action here, though severe, 
was "not unusual" (R. 171). The cases hold that res ipsa 
is not applicable under the circumstances of this case. See 
e. g. Hunt v. Chirll{JO, n. & Q. R. Co., 181 Iowa <'45, 165 K. 
W. 105. In the Hunt case the court said: 
"* * * 'Turning, then, to the case before 
us, what was the accident Khich resulted in the 
plaintiff's injury? It was a sudden jerking to an 
unusual degree of the caboose of a freight train. 
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What were the circumstances of this unusual jerk~ 
ing? In a sense, there were no circumstances, ex-
cept the fact of the jerking, unless we treat as a 
circumstance the fact that the train was about to 
stop at the water tank. Such a stop would need to 
be at a particular plan~, and the attempt to make 
it might result in a sudden jerking. The so-called 
accident ·was so void of circumstances that it would 
not have been deemed as an accident at all, except 
for the injury to the plaintiff. We think it quite 
clear that there is nothing in the nature of the cir-
cumstances of this accident to open the door to the 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa. To apply 
such doctrine to this case would be in effect to say 
that the fact of the accident is prima facie proof of 
the negligence.'" 
Instruction No. 20 was not error. 
POINT IV. 
TXSTRUCTION NO. 23 \-VAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
Plaintiff's exception to Instruction Ko. 23 is npon the 
same grounds as his exception to Instruction I\To. 20. The 
plaintiff himself testified : 
"Q. You are putting the blame solely on an 
improper application of the brakes by the engineer. 
"A. y . " es, 1:\Jr. 
The court instructed by Instruction No. 20: 
"Before you can find the Railroad negligent in 
this case you must find that the engineer operating 
the train failed W do what an ordinary prudent en-
gineer would have done under the circumstances." 
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We fail to see the error. Counsel argues that this in-
struction precluded a possible finding that the brakemen, 
Wonnacott and Serassio, were negligent. With regard fu 
this, plaintiff said: 
"Q. In any event you don't blame any of the 
brakemen for anything that occurred in this par-
ticular case 1 
"A. No, sir." 
There was no contention below that the stop itself ru; 
distinguished from the manner of the stop was negligence. 
Neither the pleadings, pretrial order nor requested instruc-
tions set forth such a theory. Instruction 23 was in com-
plete accord with plaintiff's evidence and the the<~ry Oll 
which the ease was tried below. Even had plaintiff con-
tended below that the stop itself was negligence, such theory 
should not have been submitted to the jury for reasons 
stated in answer to Point III, supra, and particularly in view 
of the fact that plaintiff himself said the move which neees-
sitated the stop was "proper and usual" (Exhibit 12). A 
contrary holding would virtually make it impossible for 
railroad companies to conduct switching operations witlt· 
out liability to any employee who may be injured by movl:" 
ment of a train. This court is aware of the fact that the 
operation of a freight train is not a sight-seeing tour. It 
is necessarily attended with unaYoidable perils well known 
to experienced trainmen. 
POINT V. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
Instruction No. 24 is substantially identical to J. I. F. 
U. Instruction No. 16.6. It is an established rule of law in 
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negligence cases that the mere fact of an accident does not 
support an inference of negligence. Williams v. Ogden 
Union Raitway and Depot Company, 119 Utah 529, 230 P. 
2d 315; Hursley v. Robinson, 112 utah 227, 186 P. 2d 592. 
This is so even in a case where res ipsa is applicable. It is 
pointed out under Point Ill, supra, that the doctrine of res 
ipsa is not applicable except upon specific findings in addi-
tion to the occurrence of the accident itself. Instruction Ko. 
14 gave the plaintiff full benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. We point out here, as we have previously noted, 
that the plaintiff in this case was not entitled to the benefit 
of that doctrine anyway. 
POINT VI. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR. 
Instruction Ko. 21 told. the jury that an independent 
application as distinguished from a service application 
would not ipso facto establish negligence. The jury was 
told by said intruction that they should determine whether 
an independent application would under the circumstances 
amount to negligence. Certainly it was the jury's preroga-
tive under the evidence to· determine this. The evidence dis-
closed that either type of brake application would result in 
slack action. 
It is difficult to see how the plaintiff can complain of 
this instruction. Plaintiff now argues that an independent 
application of the brakes would have amounted to negli-
gence as a matter of law. Plaintiff did not request an in-
struction to that effect. The jury had already been in-
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structed that it was their duty to decide the issue of negli. 
gence. In the absence of said instruction, they would have 
been required under the general instructions of the court 
to determine what type of application had been made and 
whether or not the specific application amounted to negJi. 
gence. .Instruction No. 21 did not therefore change the 
picture at alL Even if the instruction had been error, it 
could neither have helped the defendant nor hindered the 
plaintiff. In the absence of a special request by plaintiff, 
he is hardly in a position to argue that the trial court should 
have instructed that specific conduct amounted to neg!i. 
gence or that the court erred in instructing that specific 
conduct did not amount to negligence as a matter of law. 
An additional answer to plaintiff's argument on this 
point is that considering the testimony of the engineer and 
the expert \vitness there was no substantial evidence that 
an independent application had been made. Certainly tile 
plaintiff and Serassio, standing a mile behind the locoJ:IID. 
tive, were in no position to judge. Likewise Wonnaoott 
could not have possiblr known "·hether a service applica-
tion or an independent application had been made. 
\Ye submit that Instruction ::\o. :21 could not have ad-
versely affected plaintiff's ca.se. 
POI:!'-IT YII. 
THE COURT DID NOT cmnnT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR \VHEI\ IT STRl"CI\: THE TEs-
TIMONY OF THE WIT~ESS, P.\l_ll. FRANK 
THOMAS. 
The witness, Thomas, testified that on the evening of 
t.he accident he was in the defendant'~ ~-ard office. He said 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
that he heard a train stop and "one crash" (H. 266). He 
did not know whether he had seen the train or not (R. 265), 
and, of course, he was unable to identify it or any of the 
cars or the caboose. His characterization o£ the stop as 
being a single crash was contrary to all of the other evi-
dence indicating that the stop resulted in a rumble and a 
series of crashes or "bings" as the cars and the train came 
to a stop. To say that what Thomas heard was the same 
train involves a good measure of speculation and conjecture. 
But what difference does it make what he heard? The evi-
dence was clear that there was slack action resulting in 
noise as the train came to a stop. There is no dispute on 
this. What Thomas heard adds nothing whatever to the 
plaintiff's case and the exclusion of such testimony could 
not even by the greatest stretch of the imagination have 
been prejudicial. 
Regarding Thomas's testimony pertaining to the ap-
pearance of the plaintiff sometime after the accident, we 
point out that such evidence might have probative value if 
there was an issue as to the fad that plaintiff was injured. 
This, however, was undisputed, the fact of injury being 
testified to by plaintiff and corroborated by other evidence 
in the record. The exclusion of evidence relating to this 
could not have been prejudicial in this case. The jury never 
got to the issues of damage as the case was obviously de-
cided on the issue of negligence. There was proof of injury 
and damages, and if we assume, as we must, that the jury 
followed the instructions of the conrt. their verdict would 
necessarily have been in favor of the plaintiff and some 
damages would have been awarded had they found in favor 
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of plaintiff on the issue of negligence and proximate cause, 
It therefore follows that the testimony of Thoma.s cot:!.-! J.ot 
possibly have made any difference in the outcome of tlili 
M~. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the plaintiff has been accorded a fair 
and impartial trial of his case. The jury under proper in-
structions fram the court simply found that the defendant 
was not guilty of any negligence proximately causing plain· 
tiff's injuries. We alsD submit that this issue of negligence 
should have been decided by the court on defendant's moti001 
for directed verdict. Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
GRANT MACF ARLAXE, JR., 
For Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and R68porulent. 
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